Hoops Rumors Originals

Checking In On NBA’s Open Roster Spots

Nearly two months into the NBA’s 2023/24 season, there are only eight open roster spots available across the league. Each team is permitted to carry up to 15 players on standard contracts and three on two-way deals, so that means 532 of 540 total roster spots are occupied.

All 90 two-way contract slots are currently filled, which means that each of the eight remaining openings is a standard slot.

Here are the teams that are currently carrying only 14 players on their respective standard rosters:

  • Boston Celtics
  • Chicago Bulls
  • Cleveland Cavaliers
  • Golden State Warriors
  • Los Angeles Lakers
  • Miami Heat
  • Minnesota Timberwolves
  • New Orleans Pelicans

The Celtics, Warriors, Lakers, Heat, and Pelicans are all currently over the luxury tax line and presumably aren’t eager to increase their projected end-of-season tax bills without a very good reason to do so. It seems likely that all five teams will fill their 15th roster spots by the end of the regular season, but there has been no urgency to do so yet.

While Boston, Golden State, and Miami have team salaries well beyond the tax threshold, Los Angeles and New Orleans aren’t far above that cutoff, so if the opportunity arises at the trade deadline, we could see them try to make cost-cutting trades in order to duck the tax. That figures to be more of a priority for the Pelicans, who have never been taxpayers, than it will be for the Lakers, who will likely be willing to take on additional salary for the right upgrade.

As for the Bulls, Cavaliers, and Timberwolves, all three teams entered the season close enough to the tax line that it didn’t make sense to carry a 15th man who would’ve pushed team salary above that threshold.

Chicago and Minnesota have a little more breathing room than Cleveland and could sign a free agent today without going into the tax, but I expect they’ll be patient — both teams are candidates to make trade deadline moves, so if they have to take back an extra $1-2MM in salaries in a deal, that breathing room below the tax will come in handy.

The injury-ravaged Cavaliers could benefit from adding a 15th man, but they’re less than $800K away from the tax line and have no interest in becoming a taxpayer, per Chris Fedor of Cleveland.com. A trade or buyout involving Ricky Rubio, which they’ve reportedly begun looking into, could generate some additional flexibility to fill out the roster, but there has been no indication anything is imminent.

Hoops Rumors Glossary: G League Assignments

NBA G League teams have no shortage of ways to stock their rosters. They can retain players’ returning rights, add players through the G League draft, acquire players via waivers, take on affiliate players from NBA training camps, sign players they find in preseason tryout camps, and carry players on two-way contracts. Yet perhaps the most noteworthy players to pass through the G League come via NBA assignment.

The players assigned to the G League by NBA teams aren’t quite like other G-Leaguers. NBA players receive their full NBA salaries while on G League assignment, whereas a G League player without an NBA contract receives far more modest annual earnings ($41K for most NBAGL players in 2023/24).

A G League assignment could technically come at a financial cost for an NBA player, since performance in the NBAGL doesn’t count toward any incentive clauses built into an NBA contract. So if a player heads down to the G League on a rehab assignment and plays in a couple games for his NBA club’s affiliate, none of the numbers he puts up during that assignment would count toward the performance incentives built into his contract.

Generally speaking though, only longer-tenured veteran NBA players have incentives in their contracts, and most of those players won’t be assigned to the G League. Virtually all of the NBA players assigned to the G League have fewer than three full years of experience, since players in their first, second or third NBA seasons are the only ones whom NBA teams can unilaterally send down to the G League.

A player with at least three years of NBA service under his belt can be assigned to the G League, but it requires the player’s consent and a sign-off from the players’ union. Most of the time, these assignments are for injury rehab purposes, like when the Cavaliers sent Jarrett Allen to the Cleveland Charge while he was working his way back from a left ankle bone bruise early in the season.

Occasionally, a healthy player with at least three years of experience will approve a G League assignment. For instance, Trail Blazers center Moses Brown, who hasn’t been part of Portland’s regular rotation at the NBA level this season, has accepted multiple assignments to the Rip City Remix, where he has gotten the opportunity to play a larger role.

Once a player has been assigned to the G League, he can remain there indefinitely, and lengthy stints aren’t uncommon. However, since there’s no limit to the number of times an NBA team can assign and recall a player, assignments can also be very brief, particularly now that many teams are in close geographical proximity to their G League affiliates. There have even been instances in which a player suits up for an NBAGL team earlier in the day, then is recalled to play for his NBA club later that night.

A total of 27 NBA teams own their G League affiliates outright, while two others (the Rockets and Nuggets) operate the basketball operations of their affiliates in “hybrid” partnerships with local ownership groups. Teams that have these arrangements can set up a unified system in which the G League club runs the same offensive and defensive schemes as its parent club, and coaches dole out playing time based on what’s best for the NBA franchise.

Only one NBA club – the Suns – doesn’t have a G League affiliate of its own in 2023/24. However, Phoenix can still assign players to the G League via the “flexible assignment” rule. If, for instance, the Suns want to send Jordan Goodwin to the G League, NBAGL teams can volunteer to accept him. Phoenix can choose from those clubs if there are multiple volunteers, but if no G League team raises its hand, the NBAGL will randomly choose one of its hybrid affiliate teams to accept Goodwin.

Goodwin isn’t a viable candidate for a G League assignment, since he plays regular minutes for the Suns, but he’s the only player on the roster who has fewer than three years of NBA service, making him the only Phoenix player who could be unilaterally assigned to the NBAGL.

Only players on standard NBA contracts can be assigned to the G League and recalled to the NBA — while players on two-way contracts can also be shuttled back and forth between the two leagues, those moves are referred to as “transfers,” rather than assignments or recalls.


Note: This is a Hoops Rumors Glossary entry. Our glossary posts will explain specific rules relating to trades, free agency, or other aspects of the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. Larry Coon’s Salary Cap FAQ was used in the creation of this post.

Earlier versions of this post were published by Luke Adams and Chuck Myron, most recently in 2021.

Hoops Rumors Glossary: Hard Cap

The NBA’s salary cap is a “soft” cap, which is why most teams’ salaries have surpassed the $136,021,000 threshold for the 2023/24 season. Once a team uses up all of its cap room, it can use a series of “exceptions” – including the mid-level, bi-annual, and various forms of Bird rights – to exceed the cap.

Since the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement doesn’t feature a “hard” cap by default, teams can construct rosters that not only exceed the cap but also blow past the luxury tax line ($165,294,000 in ’23/24). While it would be nearly impossible in practical terms, there’s technically no rule restricting a club from having a team salary worth double or triple the salary cap.

However, there are certain scenarios in 2023/24 in which a team can become hard-capped at one of two thresholds, known as the “tax aprons.” Those scenarios are as follows:

A team becomes hard-capped at the first tax apron if:

  1. The team uses its bi-annual exception to sign a player.
  2. The team uses more than the taxpayer portion of the mid-level exception to sign a player (or multiple players).
    • Note: In 2023/24, the taxpayer MLE is worth $5,000,000, compared to $12,405,000 for the full non-taxpayer MLE. The taxpayer MLE can be used to complete deals up to two years, while the non-taxpayer MLE can be used to complete deals up to four years.
  3. The team uses any portion of its mid-level exception to acquire a player via trade or waiver claim.
  4. The team acquires a player via sign-and-trade.
  5. The team signs a player who was waived during the current regular season, if his pre-waiver salary for 2023/24 exceeded the amount of the non-taxpayer mid-level exception ($12,405,000).
  6. The team takes back more than 110% of the salary it sends out in a trade (using salary-matching rather than cap room).

A team making any of those six roster moves must ensure that its team salary is below the first tax apron when it finalizes the transaction and remains below the apron for the rest of the league year.

For the 2023/24 league year, the first apron is set at $172,346,000, which is $7,052,000 above the tax line. A team that completes one of the six moves listed above can’t surpass that line under any circumstances.

A team becomes hard-capped at the second tax apron if:

  1. The team uses any portion of the mid-level exception to sign a player.

Under the previous Collective Bargaining Agreement, every team was permitted to use at least some portion of the mid-level exception, but it’s no longer available to teams above the second tax apron, so a club that uses any part of the MLE is hard-capped at that second apron.

As noted above, a team that uses more than the taxpayer portion ($5MM) is hard-capped at the first apron, which means teams between the first and second apron are allowed to spend up to $5MM in MLE money.

For the 2023/24 league year, the second apron is set at $182,794,000, which is $17.5MM above the tax line.

So far in ’23/24, a total of 11 teams have hard-capped themselves at the first tax apron by acquiring a player via sign-and-trade, using the non-taxpayer mid-level exception, using the bi-annual exception, or taking back more than 110% of the outgoing salary in a trade. Two more teams have hard-capped themselves at the second apron by using $5MM in mid-level money.

For many of those teams, the restriction is barely noticeable — they remain far below their hard cap and haven’t had to worry about whether a roster move might put them over it. However, a handful of clubs will have to be wary of that hard cap as they approach the trade deadline.

It’s worth noting that even if a team starts a new league year above the tax apron, that doesn’t mean they can’t become hard-capped at some point later in the season. For example, the Warriors are currently well above the second apron, but in the unlikely event that they dump a couple big contracts and then use $5MM of their mid-level exception to sign a free agent, a hard cap would be imposed and they’d be ineligible to surpass the $182.8MM second apron for the rest of the league year.

In other words, the hard cap applies from the moment a team completes one of the transactions listed above, but isn’t applied retroactively.

The list of roster moves that will impose a hard cap on a team will expand beginning in the 2024 offseason. After the last day of the 2023/24 regular season, the following restrictions will apply:

A team becomes hard-capped at the first tax apron if:

  1. The team takes back more than 100% of the salary it sends out in a trade (when over the cap).
    • Note: This will replace the fifth rule listed above, reducing the salary-matching limit from 110% to 100% for teams over the first apron.
  2. The team uses a traded player exception generated during the prior year (ie. between the end of the previous regular season and the end of the most recent regular season).

A team becomes hard-capped at the second tax apron if:

  1. The team aggregates two or more player salaries in a trade.
  2. The team sends out cash as part of a trade.
  3. The team acquires a player using a traded player exception that was created by sending out a player via sign-and-trade.
    • Note: This applies whether the traded player exception is generated as part of a simultaneous trade (ie. using an outgoing signed-and-traded player for matching purposes) or non-simultaneous trade (ie. in a subsequent trade, using a TPE previously generated by sending out a player via sign-and-trade).

Typically, a team’s hard cap expires on June 30 when the current league year comes to an end, with the team getting a clean slate on July 1. However, beginning in the 2024 offseason, if a team engages in any of the trade-related transactions prohibited for first or second apron teams between the end of the regular season and June 30, the team will not be permitted to exceed that apron level during the following season.

If, for example, a team sends out cash in a trade in June of 2024, that team won’t be allowed to exceed the second tax apron during the 2024/25 league year. The inverse is also true — a team whose 2024/25 salary projects to be over the second apron won’t be able to trade cash in June.

This rule only applies to trade-related transactions because the ones related to free agency don’t come into effect between the end of the regular season and the start of the next league year.


Note: This is a Hoops Rumors Glossary entry. Our glossary posts will explain specific rules relating to trades, free agency, or other aspects of the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. Larry Coon’s Salary Cap FAQ was used in the creation of this post.

Previous versions of this post was published in 2020 and 2021.

Hoops Rumors Glossary: Salary Aggregation

When an NBA team is over the salary cap and wants to make a trade, certain rules in the Collective Bargaining Agreement dictate how much salary the team is permitted to take back. These salary-matching rules are evolving – they changed prior to this season and will change again in 2024 – but in most cases, an over-the-cap team must send out nearly as much salary as it acquires for the trade to be legal.

In some scenarios, salary aggregation is required in order to legally match the incoming player’s cap hit. Aggregation is the act of combining multiple players’ salaries in order to reach that legal outgoing limit.

For example, let’s say Team A has a team salary above the first tax apron and wants to acquire a player earning $30MM from Team B. Sending out a player earning $25MM would fall short of the minimum requirement, since Team A can only bring back up to 110% of the outgoing amount. Trading a $25MM player would allow the team to acquire up to $27.5MM in salary.

However, by adding a second player earning $3MM to its package, Team A would reach the minimum outgoing threshold by “aggregating” its two traded players, resulting in a total of $28MM in outgoing salary — that’s enough to bring back a $30MM player.

Only player salaries can be aggregated. Trade exceptions cannot be aggregated with one another or with players. That means a team with a $10MM trade exception can’t aggregate that exception with a $20MM player (or a separate $20MM trade exception) to acquire a $30MM player.

Crucially, sending out two players together in a trade doesn’t necessarily mean they have to be aggregated.

For instance, if Team A sends out one player earning $28MM and another earning $5MM in exchange for its incoming $30MM player, there’s no need to aggregate the two outgoing salaries. Since $28MM is an amount sufficient to take back $30MM, the $5MM player can essentially be traded for “nothing,” creating a $5MM trade exception that could be used at a later date.

Because trade exceptions can only be created in “non-simultaneous” trades and salary aggregation can only be completed in a “simultaneous” trade, trade exceptions can’t be generated in scenarios in which salaries are aggregated. In the hypothetical trade above, swapping the $28MM player for the $30MM player represents a simultaneous trade, while sending out the $5MM player represents a non-simultaneous trade, resulting in the trade exception.

Here’s another example to illustrate that point, using the same $30MM incoming player: If Team A decides to salary-match by sending out one player earning $20MM and a second earning $15MM, that team can’t generate a trade exception worth the excess amount ($5MM), because the two outgoing salaries must be aggregated, resulting in a simultaneous trade.

One good recent example of salary aggregation came when the Clippers acquired James Harden and P.J. Tucker from the Sixers last month. Harden ($35,640,000) and Tucker ($11,014,500) were earning a combined $46,654,500, so the Clippers – whose team salary was above both tax aprons – needed to send out at least $42,413,182 to get to within 10% of that amount.

Paul George or Kawhi Leonard are each earning more than $42.4MM on their own, but they weren’t going to be part of the deal with Philadelphia and no other Clipper was making close to that amount, so the team had to aggregate several players’ salaries in order to meet the required threshold. Los Angeles used Marcus Morris ($17,116,279), Nicolas Batum ($11,710,818), Robert Covington ($11,692,308), and KJ Martin ($1,930,681) to get there.

Because the Clippers’ four outgoing players combined to earn $42,450,086, the team was able to take back up to $46,695,095 (110% of the outgoing amount). That means that Harden was able to receive a small portion ($40,595) of his trade bonus while waiving the remaining amount. If Harden had insisted on receiving even one more dollar of his bonus, the Clippers would have had to aggregate a fifth salary to make the deal work.

The NBA’s trade rules state that when a team acquires a player using salary-matching or a trade exception (rather than cap room), it cannot aggregate that player’s salary in a second trade for two months.

The one exception to that rule occurs if a player is traded on or before December 16, but less than two months until that season’s trade deadline. In that case, the player is permitted to be aggregated again either on the day before the deadline or the day of the deadline.

Any player traded after December 16 can’t have his salary aggregated with another player’s before the trade deadline. But, as outlined above, that doesn’t mean that a player acquired after today can’t be traded again before the deadline along with other players — it simply means his salary can’t be aggregated as part of the deal.

Here are a couple more notes related to salary aggregation:

  • Beginning in the 2024 offseason, a team whose total salary is above the second tax apron will not be permitted to aggregate salaries as part of a trade. A team that does aggregate salaries in a trade will become hard-capped at the second apron for the rest of that league year (or for the following league year, if the trade is made between the end of the regular season and June 30).
  • If a team is aggregating three (or more) player salaries in a trade for matching purposes in order to take back fewer players than that, no more than one of the aggregated players can be earning the minimum salary. This rule doesn’t apply between December 15 and the trade deadline, but is in effect the rest of the year.

Note: This is a Hoops Rumors Glossary entry. Our glossary posts will explain specific rules relating to trades, free agency, or other aspects of the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement. Larry Coon’s Salary Cap FAQ was used in the creation of this post.

A previous version of this post was published in 2022.

Trade Breakdown: Chris Paul To The Warriors

This is the third entry in our series breaking down the significant trades of the 2023 offseason. As opposed to giving out grades, this series explores why the teams were motivated to make the moves. Let’s dive into a blockbuster deal between the Warriors and Wizards…


On July 6:

  • The Warriors acquired Chris Paul.
  • The Wizards acquired Jordan Poole, Patrick Baldwin Jr., Ryan Rollins, the Warriors’ 2030 first-round pick (top-20 protected), the Warriors’ 2027 second-round pick, and cash.
  • Note: The Wizards created a $3,344,643 traded player exception as part of this deal, which is the difference between Paul’s outgoing salary ($30,800,000) and the incoming salary of Poole ($27,455,357). Baldwin ($2,337,720) and Rollins ($1,719,864) were acquired via existing TPEs.

The Warriors’ perspective:

Poole being traded was seemingly inevitable as soon as the Warriors lost in the second round of the 2022/23 playoffs, with the young guard struggling mightily throughout the postseason. It had been clear for a while that it was probably going to come down to moving Poole or Draymond Green, whom the team re-signed to a four-year, $100MM contract in free agency.

The Warriors needed to reconfigure their chemistry and on-court results following an uneven attempt to repeat as champions last season. Instead of moving on from a core member of their dynasty, they traded Poole.

That really wasn’t much of a choice – Green has arguably been the best defensive player in the league over the past decade, helping Golden State reach six NBA Finals and win four championships, and Stephen Curry has referred to him as his favorite teammate.

Green has made plenty of poor decisions over the years – he’s annually one of the league leaders in technical fouls and has been suspended multiple times in the regular season and playoffs. Blowing up the Warriors’ season before it even began by punching a teammate he had previously mentored was a new low. And despite plenty of media grandstanding, he never publicly or privately apologized to Poole, according to Logan Murdock of The Ringer.

The organization has always catered to Green, as he didn’t even face punishment for the incident other than an undisclosed fine. Following a string of incidents in ’23/24, he received an indefinite suspension to (perhaps) address some of the underlying causes for his reckless behavior.

It’s worth noting that Green will make less money than Poole ($123MM+) over the next four years as well. Future payroll considerations played a significant factor in this deal, as owner Joe Lacob acknowledged in September.

The Warriors have had record-setting luxury tax bills for multiple years running, but Lacob has said they hope to be below the second tax apron in ‘24/25. Paul’s $30MM salary for ‘24/25 is non-guaranteed, while Poole will be in the second year of his rookie scale extension.

Even if Golden State wins the title in ‘23/24 – which is looking extremely unlikely at this point — I’d be shocked if the team guarantees Paul’s salary for next season. The only way that would make sense would be if the Warriors trade him for a roster upgrade in the offseason, but that would probably require taking on long-term money, which they’ve said they want to avoid.

That doesn’t mean the Warriors can’t try to re-sign Paul at a lower figure, assuming things turn around and he’s open to it. That would require a major discount though, as they’ll lose his Bird rights if they waive him — they’d likely be limited to offering him a minimum-salary deal unless they remove additional salary from their books.

The logic behind this trade made sense for the Warriors, but I’m sure it was painful to move Poole so soon after extending him, even if they view Paul as a short-term upgrade. That’s reasonable enough.

Paul is one of the greatest point guards in NBA history, earning 12 All-Star berths, 11 All-NBA nods, and nine All-Defensive spots over the course of his 18 seasons. He has led the league in steals per game six times and assists per game five times, with three of those seasons overlapping.

Despite being 38 years old, Paul remains a clear upgrade over Poole in several areas. He’s a better rebounder, and there’s not so much a gap as a chasm between Paul’s defense, decision-making, passing, and ability to take care of the ball compared to Poole’s. Paul is nicknamed “the Point God” for a reason.

Turnovers were a major problem for the Warriors in ‘22/23, with the team ranking 29th in the league with a 15.8% turnover percentage. Poole was a major contributor to that, averaging 3.1 turnovers per game — second-most on the team behind Curry — and posting a 1.46-to-1 assist-to-turnover ratio, slightly worse than his career mark (1.61-to-1).

Remarkably, Paul has had an assist-to-turnover ratio below 3-to-1 only once in his career – back in 2019/20 with OKC, when he shared ball-handling duties and was more focused on scoring. And even then, it was just barely under (2.93-to-1). For his career, he’s at 3.98-to-1. Last season: 4.6-to-1. So far in ‘23/24: 6-to-1.

While it’s true that the Warriors had to attach some marginal assets to move Poole’s long-term contract, this trade does show one of the fringe benefits of rookie scale extensions: Having his salary already locked in for ’24/25 meant that Golden State didn’t have to deal with restricted free agency or work out a sign-and-trade, which is much more complicated, especially for the league’s biggest spenders.

He has never won a title, but Paul’s teams have made the playoffs 15 times in his 18 years in the league, including the last 13 seasons in a row.

His elite basketball IQ undoubtedly remains, but Paul’s ability to create shots for himself and convert them at a high level has taken a step back. Through 21 games, he has a career-low true shooting percentage (53.2%) and usage rate (15.0%). Part of that is due to the team’s roster construction, but he also isn’t playing at the same level as he did a couple years ago.

Obviously, there are major injury concerns as well, and Poole was quite durable, appearing in 76 and 82 regular season games the past two years (compared to 65 and 59 for Paul).

The Warriors miss Poole’s ability to generate offense for himself, take on an increased scoring load when Curry misses time, and get to the free throw line – Golden State was dead last in free throw attempts per game in ‘22/23, and Poole led the team with 5.1 per contest (just ahead of Curry at 5.0).

After starting the season 5-1, the Warriors have gone 5-13 over their past 18 games and currently hold a 10-14 record. The majority of those defeats have been very competitive, with blowing leads an issue of late. Still, as the saying goes, a loss is a loss.

With Golden State in a tailspin, it would be easy to point the finger at a newcomer like Paul. But the Warriors have been markedly better when he’s on the court and much worse when he’s off, and advanced stats say he’s been one of the more impactful players on the team.

Paul has been spearheading the second unit, which has undergone a remarkable turnaround to this point – it’s actually the starting unit that has struggled in ’23/24, not the reserves. Last season was the total opposite, as the starters were the best five-man group in the NBA and the bench was a major liability.

Both Rollins and Baldwin missed chunks of their rookie seasons in ‘22/23 and didn’t play much at the NBA level when they were healthy. They almost certainly weren’t going to have rotation roles for the Warriors this season either. The 2027 second-rounder isn’t a significant asset on its own.

Trading the 2030 first-round pick stings, even if it’s heavily protected (it will turn into Golden State’s 2030 second-rounder if it doesn’t convey). The primary reason for that has less to do with the pick itself and more to do with the Stepien rule, which will prevent the Warriors from trading their own first-rounders in 2029 and 2031, at least once they’re able to (you can only trade picks seven years out).

Dealing three young players and marginal draft assets for a future Hall of Famer who is still effective but clearly in the twilight of his career showed that new general manager Mike Dunleavy Jr. is willing to make bold moves, particularly with an eye on future financial flexibility. I certainly wouldn’t rule out the possibility of the Warriors trading Paul again this season either, depending on how they play in the next several weeks leading up to the deadline.


The Wizards’ perspective:

I admire Poole for two reasons. One, he’s a late first-round pick who struggled mightily early in his career, spent a lot of time in the G League, and then emerged as an important contributor on a championship team.

Two, I never once saw him publicly discuss last fall’s incident when he had every opportunity to throw Green and the Warriors under the bus. There are no “competitor” justifications for Green did – it was wrong, plain and simple.

Imagine being asked nearly every day about something terrible that happened to you, that millions of people witnessed via video, and you only take the high road. That says something about Poole as a person, regardless of what you think of him as player.

I can’t say I’ve ever been partial to Poole’s game. He’s undeniably talented, but flashy scorers who don’t play defense aren’t my cup of tea.

Paul didn’t fit the Wizards based on the position they’re currently in. Poole, Baldwin, Rollins and draft assets do.

As mentioned in a previous article, Paul was the primary salary-matching piece acquired in the Bradley Beal trade, so these two deals are directly connected. For the Wizards, this was about flipping Paul for as many assets as they could.

Is Poole even an asset right now? I would say no, he likely has negative value due to his declining play. But that doesn’t mean the reasoning for this trade was illogical at the time it was made.

It’s easy to overlook now that he’s no longer on the team, but Poole was a key member of the Warriors’ championship run in ’21/22, averaging 17.0 points, 2.8 rebounds and 3.8 assists over 22 playoff games (27.5 minutes). He posted a .508/.391/.915 shooting line over that span for 65.4% TS – an elite mark. That’s a big part of why Golden State gave him the extension.

But the NBA is a “what have you done for me lately” league, and Poole struggled mightily last postseason, averaging more field goal attempts (10.4) than points (10.3) while his shooting rates dipped to .341/.254/.765 (a dreadful 44.7% TS) in 13 games (21.8 MPG). His apathetic defense, poor shot selection, questionable decision-making and inconsistency were issues throughout ‘22/23.

I thought Poole might have a turnaround with Washington in ‘23/24, and I wasn’t alone. In early August, one betting site had him as a way-too-early favorite for Most Improved Player.

Poole averaged 25.6 points, 4.7 rebounds and 5.6 assists on 59.5% TS in 17 games with Curry sidelined in ‘21/22. He averaged 26.1 points, 2.8 rebounds and 5.0 assists on 56.5% TS in 26 games with Curry injured last season. There were valid reasons to think he could put up big numbers this season.

I was wrong, and the Wizards’ gamble hasn’t paid off to this point. Poole has had a dreadful start to the season, with advanced stats indicating he has been one of the worst rotation regulars in the NBA – perhaps even the worst high-usage player in the league.

Poole’s numbers are down across the board — he has recorded fewer points, rebounds and assists per game in nearly the same amount of minutes as ‘21/22 and ‘22/23. His turnover rate is up and his assist rate is down. His efficiency has cratered, with his true shooting percentage down to 51.0%, compared to 58.4% over the last three seasons (for context, the league average TS in ’23/24 is 57.7%, but it’s nearly always a couple points lower for guards).

The Wizards are terrible. They’re 3-20, which remarkably is only tied for the second-worst record in the league.

Despite their overall ineptitude, there’s still no sugarcoating how poorly Poole has played in his 22 games. His net rating differential is a ghastly minus-19.9. When he’s off the court, the team actually has a (slightly) positive net rating – he’s the only player on the roster who holds that distinction.

Rollins has only played 49 minutes for the Wizards; Baldwin is at 36. You can’t draw any conclusions from sample sizes that small. They’re young, on relatively inexpensive contracts, and may or may not develop into useful NBA players.

Given Poole’s poor play and pricey long-term deal, the lack of roles for Rollins and Baldwin, and the fairly modest draft assets the Wizards acquired for Paul, you could argue the early return hasn’t been great for the Wizards. However, that’s only a small part of the bigger picture.

Beal’s contract is far more onerous than Poole’s, as he’s owed $208MM over the next four years and has a full no-trade clause. And he’s only played five games in ‘23/24 so far due to a back injury.

Beal, 30, had no place in a rebuild. Nor did Paul, whom the Suns reportedly considered waiving before making a high-risk, high-reward trade for Beal.

In total, when combining the two trades, the Wizards received Poole, Baldwin, Rollins, Landry Shamet, a top-20 protected first-rounder, four first-round swaps, seven second-round picks (one was sent to Indiana) and cash for Beal.

Poole is only 24 and doesn’t have a no-trade clause. Some of those pick swaps could be valuable in the future. Second-round picks can be useful, for trades and for finding diamonds in the rough. They could probably flip Shamet into another second-rounder or two if they want to move him.

The Wizards accomplished their overall goal of acquiring assets while getting younger and focusing on player development. Time will tell if they’re able to turn into a winning franchise, but they’ve been stuck in NBA purgatory for decades, and needed to get worse before they had a chance at getting better.

81 NBA Players Newly Eligible To Be Traded

Today is December 15, which means that – by our count – 81 NBA players who signed as free agents this offseason have officially become eligible to be traded.

The list of newly trade-eligible players, which can be found right here, features a number of guys who almost certainly aren’t going anywhere this season, such as Rockets guard Fred VanVleet. However, it also includes some players whose names have already popped up in trade speculation in the months since they were signed, such as Lakers guard D’Angelo Russell.

Kyrie Irving, Draymond Green, Khris Middleton, Russell Westbrook, and Dillon Brooks are some of the other notable players who are trade-eligible as of Friday.

Eight of the players on the list can’t be dealt without their consent, since they have the ability to veto trades this season. The Clippers, Bucks, and Suns are each carrying multiple players who fit that bill.

Twelve more newly trade-eligible players are still on non-guaranteed contracts, including multiple members of the Celtics and Nets.

Finally, it’s worth noting that there are still many recently signed players around the NBA who remain ineligible to be dealt. Some will become trade-eligible on January 15, while others have specific dates to watch.

Of course, while December 15 is considered the unofficial start of the NBA’s trade season, we shouldn’t expect a flurry of deals in the coming days. Typically, teams wait until closer to the trade deadline (February 8) to make their moves.

The most recent trade to be completed on December 15 occurred in 2010, and there generally aren’t more than one or two deals made between now and the new year. In 2022/23, the first in-season trade didn’t occur until January 5.

The league’s recent trade history doesn’t mean we won’t see any trades this month, but if there are more than a couple, it would be an exception to the rule. We should expect more activity in January and February, even as talks start to heat up in December.

Roster Decisions Looming For Grizzlies

For much of the season, the Grizzlies have been permitted to carry multiple players beyond the 15 that NBA teams are typically allowed to have on their standard rosters.

Memphis first qualified for an extra roster spot five games into Ja Morant‘s suspension, when the team was able to move him to the suspended list for the remaining 20 games of his ban, opening up a roster spot that the Grizzlies used to sign Bismack Biyombo.

[RELATED: 2023/24 NBA Roster Counts]

A series of injuries resulted in two more additional roster spots for the Grizzlies — they qualified for a pair of hardship exceptions as a result of having players sidelined due to medium- or long-term ailments.

One of those hardship exceptions expired earlier in the month, forcing Memphis to part ways with guard Shaquille Harrison, but the team is still carrying Jaylen Nowell on a hardship deal in addition to Biyombo. It’s just a matter of time though until the Grizzlies will be required to get back down to 15 players.

Let’s take a closer look at the key roster decisions facing the club…

Nowell and the hardship exception:

Nowell’s second 10-day contract with the Grizzlies runs through Wednesday, meaning he’ll be eligible to play in one more game for the team. Once it expires, Memphis could ask the NBA for another 10-day hardship exception, but it’s unclear whether such a request would be granted.

To receive a hardship exception, a team must have at least four injured players who have missed at least three consecutive games and who are expected to remain sidelined for at least two more weeks.

The Grizzlies are currently missing Steven Adams, Brandon Clarke, Marcus Smart, and Luke Kennard. Adams’ and Clarke’s injuries are long-term, with Adams expected to miss the entire season and Clarke unlikely to return until well into 2024. But Smart’s and Kennard’s returns appear much closer.

When Smart first went down with a left foot sprain, Memphis announced that he was expected to miss three-to-five weeks — that was three-and-a-half weeks ago. As for Kennard, the Grizzlies announced nine days ago that he could be back in about two or three weeks. Those recovery timelines may have changed, but if the Grizzlies are expecting either Smart or Kennard back within the next week or two, they won’t qualify for a hardship exception.

Assuming that’s the case, Memphis will have to either let Nowell walk when his 10-day contract expires tomorrow night or waive someone else in order to re-sign him.

Nowell has been playing fairly regular minutes since joining the club, but as Chris Herrington of The Daily Memphian tweets, he logged just eight minutes on Monday and didn’t play in the second half, which suggests that the Grizzlies are unlikely to move off one of their players on guaranteed contracts in order to keep him around.

Biyombo, Morant, and the suspended list:

All indications are that Morant remains on track to be activated next Tuesday ahead of the Grizzlies’ game in New Orleans, their 26th of the season. When that happens, someone will have to be waived to make room for the All-Star guard.

Biyombo, whose one-year, $5MM contract is only partially guaranteed for $1MM, is the most obvious candidate from a financial perspective, since everyone else on the roster has a fully guaranteed 2023/24 salary. But the big man has helped shore up a thin frontcourt following Adams’ season-ending surgery, and Shams Charania reported this week that Memphis would like to hang onto him.

If the Grizzlies do keep Biyombo, Kenneth Lofton Jr. seems likeliest to be waived, according to Herrington (Twitter link). The second-year forward was promoted from a two-way deal to a standard contract near the end of last season, but he hasn’t established himself as a consistent contributor this fall, averaging just 2.6 points per game on 37.8% shooting in 15 appearances (6.6 MPG). And while Lofton has two years left on his contract after this season, both are non-guaranteed.

Waiving a player on a guaranteed contract isn’t the only way the Grizzlies would be able to retain Biyombo (and/or Nowell). A trade could do the trick too, and Charania reported that Memphis has been engaged in talks with teams around the NBA. The trade market usually isn’t too active at this time of the year, but moving a minimum-salary player like Lofton wouldn’t be too complicated, and more options will open up on Friday, when several dozen players across the league become trade-eligible.

Community Shootaround: Pistons, Spurs Losing Streaks

Entering Monday’s action, the longest current winning streak in the league belonged to the Timberwolves with six straight victories. No other team had an ongoing streak longer than four games.

As for losing streaks, well that’s a different story. In terms of futility, the Pistons and Spurs are on record-setting runs.

Detroit was supposed to show significant improvement with the return of Cade Cunningham, who missed most of last season with a shin injury. Instead, the Pistons have fallen into a bottomless abyss. They’ve lost 19 straight, easily surpassing their previous single-season losing streak of 14 games.

The Spurs’ franchise was revitalized by winning the Victor Wembanyama sweepstakes in the draft lottery. Wembanyama mania was prevalent during the offseason and during camp.

However, San Antonio is only making news now by going 5 ½ weeks without a victory. The Spurs have dropped 16 straight, tying their franchise mark.

Both teams are in action tonight, with Detroit hosting the in-season tournament runners-up Pacers and San Antonio visiting much-improved Houston.

The remainder of the Pistons’ schedule before Christmas looks like this: a home-and-home with Philadelphia, at Milwaukee, at Atlanta, home vs. Utah, and at Brooklyn.

San Antonio’s remaining pre-Christmas schedule goes like this: two home games vs. the Lakers, home vs. New Orleans, at Milwaukee, at Chicago, at Dallas.

That brings us to our topic of the day: Will the Pistons and/or Spurs end their lengthy losing streaks before Christmas? If so, which opponent will they defeat to end their slides?

Please take to the comments section to weigh on this topic. We look forward to your input.

Hoops Rumors Glossary: Tax Aprons

If an NBA team’s salary continues to rise after it surpasses both the salary cap and the luxury tax line, it may reach or exceed a pair of tax “aprons.” The level of the first tax apron is several million dollars above the threshold at which a team becomes a taxpayer, while the second tax apron is another $10MM+ beyond the first apron.

A team whose salary exceeds the first apron is prohibited from making certain moves during that league year, while a team whose salary goes beyond the second apron faces even more restrictions. The goal is to limit the ability of the teams with the NBA’s highest payrolls to further upgrade their rosters and to encourage competitive balance.

Although the tax apron isn’t a new addition to the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement, the 2023 CBA represents the first time that the league’s cap system features multiple aprons. The 2023 CBA also introduced several new rules that apply to teams whose salaries are above one or both aprons.

Let’s dive in and break down the tax aprons in greater detail…


How are the tax aprons calculated?

The formula that determined the level of the first tax apron in 2023/24 was as follows:

  • Formula: $165,294,000 + ($6,716,000 x $129,838,000 / $123,655,000)
  • Result: $172,346,000
    • Note: The result was rounded to the nearest thousand.

These may just look on the surface like a collection of random numbers, but there’s a method to the madness. $165,294,000 is this season’s luxury tax line, while $6,716,000 was the gap between the tax line and the apron in 2022/23. $129,838,000 is the average of this season’s and last season’s salary caps, while $123,655,000 was the amount of last season’s salary cap.

More simply put: The gap between the tax level and the apron was calculated by taking last season’s gap and increasing it by a percentage representing half of this season’s cap increase. The cap rose by 10% this past summer; this year’s difference of $7,052,000 between the tax threshold and the first apron is 5% more than last year’s difference of $6,716,000.

Going forward, the first tax apron will increase at the same rate as the salary cap, making the calculation a little simpler. The formula will be as follows:

  • $172,346,000 x (salary cap for that season / $136,021,000)

For instance, if the salary cap for 2024/25 comes in at $145,000,000, the first tax apron would be $183,723,000.

The calculation of the second tax apron, newly created for the 2023/24 season, was much more straightforward — it was simply a matter of adding $17.5MM to this season’s tax line, so the second apron came in at $182,794,000.

Like the first apron, the second apron will rise at the same rate of the cap in future seasons, meaning the formula will be as follows:

  • $182,794,000 x (salary cap for that season / $136,021,000)

If we use that same example as above of a $145,000,000 cap for 2024/25, the second apron would come in at $194,861,000 next season.


What restrictions does a team face if its salary is above the first tax apron but below the second apron?

The restrictions facing teams above the first tax apron are different in 2023/24 than they will be in future seasons, since the NBA wanted to phase in those rules gradually rather than implementing them all at once. Rolling out the changes over a couple seasons gives teams the opportunity to adjust their rosters to account for the new apron-related rules.

Here are the moves that a team whose salary is above the first tax apron – but below the second apron – is prohibited from making in 2023/24:

  1. Acquiring a player via sign-and-trade.
  2. Using any portion of the bi-annual exception.
  3. Using more than the taxpayer portion (up to two years, with a starting salary of $5MM) of the mid-level exception.
  4. Signing a player who was waived during the current season if his pre-waiver salary for 2023/24 exceeded the amount of the non-taxpayer mid-level exception ($12,405,000).
  5. Taking back more than 110% of the salary it sends out in a trade (when over the cap).

The first four limitations on this list will remain in place in future seasons. The fifth will be modified to become even more restrictive.

Here are the additional moves that teams above the first apron – but below the second apron – will be ineligible to make beginning after the last day of the 2023/24 regular season:

  1. Taking back more than 100% of the salary it sends out in a trade (when over the cap).
  2. Using a traded player exception generated during the prior year (ie. between the end of the previous regular season and the end of the most recent regular season).

To clarify that second point, let’s say a team above the first apron currently has one trade exception worth $5MM, then generates another one worth $8MM at the 2024 trade deadline in February. Both of those exceptions would become unavailable once the team’s 2024 offseason begins.

That club could subsequently make a draft-night deal that generates a new $7MM TPE and use that exception at any point between its creation and the end of the 2024/25 regular season. But that TPE would once again become unavailable once the team’s 2025 offseason begins, prior to the typical one year expiration date.


What restrictions does a team face if its salary is above the second tax apron?

A team whose salary is above the second tax apron is prohibited from making any of the moves outlined above that are unavailable to teams above the first apron. That includes acquiring a player via sign-and-trade, using any portion of the bi-annual exception, and so on.

In 2023/24, a team above the second apron is also forbidden from using any portion of the mid-level exception.

Additional restrictions will be implemented beginning in 2024. Here are the moves that teams above the second tax apron won’t be permitted to make beginning after the last day of the 2023/24 regular season:

  1. Using any portion of the mid-level exception.
  2. Aggregating two or more player salaries in a trade.
  3. Sending out cash as part of a trade.
  4. Acquiring a player using a traded player exception if that TPE was created by sending out a player via sign-and-trade.
    • Note: This includes taking back salary in the same transaction in which a player is sent out via sign-and-trade.

Teams above the second tax apron will face one more draft-related restriction beginning in the 2024/25 league year. If the team’s salary exceeds the second apron, its first-round pick in the draft seven years away will be frozen, making it ineligible to be traded.

If the team’s salary exceeds the second apron in at least two of the following four seasons (three of five in total), the frozen pick would move to the end of the first round for that draft. Conversely, if the team stays below the second apron for at least three of the subsequent four seasons, its pick becomes “unfrozen” and is once again tradable.

For instance, let’s say the Clippers finish the 2024/25 league year above the second tax apron. That would result in their 2032 first-round pick becoming frozen. If their team salary remains above the second apron for at least two more seasons between ’25/26 and ’28/29, their frozen pick would move to the end of the 2032 first round and would remain ineligible to be traded.

If multiple teams have a frozen pick moved to the end of the first round in a particular draft, they would make their selections in reverse order of their spot in the standings in the season prior to that draft. For example, if both the Clippers and Warriors have their 2032 first-rounders moved to the end of the round and Golden State finishes ahead of L.A. in 2031/32, the Clippers would pick ahead of the Warriors in that draft.


Can a team that begins a league year above the first or second tax apron gain the ability to make additional moves by reducing its salary and dipping below the apron(s)?

Yes. If a clubs opens the 2024/25 league year carrying $200MM in salary, then engages in a series of salary-dump trades that reduce its team salary to $125MM, it would no longer be subject to the restrictions facing a an apron team.

However, as long as the team’s salary remains above the first or second apron – or if the team is completing a transaction would push its salary above one apron or the other – that team is subject to the rules that apply to that apron level.

Critically, it’s worth noting that once a club engages in a roster move that is prohibited for a team above the first or second apron, that club will be hard-capped for the rest of the season at that apron level.

In 2023/24, for instance, teams like the Cavaliers and Rockets acquired players via sign-and-trade, the Lakers and Knicks used the non-taxpayer mid-level exception, and the Thunder and Trail Blazers took back more than 110% of their outgoing salary in trades. As a result, those teams are among several that are hard-capped at the first apron ($172,346,000) and aren’t permitted to surpass that salary level for the rest of ’23/24.

The Nuggets and Grizzlies are the only teams hard-capped at the second apron this season, since they used a piece of the mid-level exception that doesn’t exceed the taxpayer portion ($5MM) allotted to teams above the first apron.

Finally, there’s one more important point related to apron level restrictions and hard caps: A team that engages in any of the trade-related transactions prohibited for first or second apron teams between the end of the regular season and the end of that league year on June 30 will not be permitted to exceed that apron level during the following season.

If, for example, a team sends out cash in a trade in June of 2024, that team won’t be allowed to exceed the second tax apron during the 2024/25 league year. The inverse is also true — a team whose 2024/25 salary projects to be over the second apron won’t be able to trade cash in June.

This rule only applies to trade-related transactions because the ones related to free agency don’t come into effect between the end of the regular season and the start of the next league year.


Anything else I should know about the tax aprons?

It’s worth pointing out that a club with a number of incentive bonuses on its books may find itself operating above the first or second apron even if its base team salary doesn’t exceed those levels.

For the purposes of calculating a team’s salary, a player’s likely incentives are included in his cap hit, but his unlikely incentives aren’t (an incentive is considered likely to be earned if it was achieved last season and unlikely to be earned if it wasn’t). However, for the purposes of determining a team’s apron level, all those incentives are counted.

That means a team with a $170MM base salary in 2023/24 and an additional $5MM in unlikely incentives would be considered a first apron team and would be unable to make certain roster moves, since there’s a chance those incentives could be earned, pushing the club’s salary above $172,346,000.


Note: This is a Hoops Rumors Glossary entry. Our glossary posts will explain specific rules relating to trades, free agency, or other aspects of the NBA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The Lakers Players Who Benefited Most From IST Prize Money

The Lakers‘ team salary this season is just above the $165.3MM luxury tax line, far exceeding the $126MM or so on the Pacers‘ books.

However, not a single player on Indiana’s roster is on a minimum-salary contract and only four Pacers players on standard deals are earning less than $5MM this season. By comparison, Los Angeles has eight players with cap hits below that $5MM threshold, including five earning the minimum.

While the $500K bonus for winning the NBA’s in-season tournament (IST) may be a drop in the bucket for maximum-salary stars like LeBron James and Anthony Davis, it serves as a significant pay raise for the players on the lower half of the Lakers’ cap sheet, as well as the players on two-way contracts who will receive bonuses worth $250K.

Here are the Lakers players for whom the NBA Cup prize money represents more than a 10% raise on their 2023/24 base salary, which is noted in parentheses:

Players receiving a $500K bonus:

Players receiving a $250K bonus:

The bonuses for Lewis and the Lakers’ two-way players represent a raise of roughly 44.7% on their respective base salaries.

The Lakers’ coaching staff also benefited financially from their in-season tournament success. Head coach Darvin Ham earned the same $500K bonus that his players did, while his assistant coaches divvied up $375K in bonus money.

The Pacers’ players and head coach Rick Carlisle went home with bonuses worth $200K (or $100K for two-way players).

None of this prize money will count against the salary cap, so the Lakers’ team salary for cap purposes remains unchanged, as do the team salaries for Indiana and the other six clubs who made the knockout round of the IST.